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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Hammond failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion either by
imposing a unified sentence of 12 years, with five years fixed, upon his guilty plea to discharge
of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, or by retaining jurisdiction rather than placing him on
probation?

Hammond Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Hammond pled guilty to discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle and the district
court imposed a unified sentence of 12 years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
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(R., pp.138-41.) Hammond filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R.,
pp.145-47.)
Hammond argues his sentence is excessive, and that the district court abused its
discretion retaining jurisdiction rather than placing him on probation, in light of his status as a
first-time felon, support from his mother, mental health issues, and purported remorse.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
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prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
A trial court's decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is appropriate is
within its discretion. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002)
(citations omitted); I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse
of discretion if it is consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521. Id. (citing State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982)). Likewise, the decision
whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will
not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 20506, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2521(1):
The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of
the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to
the defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons
in the community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
I.C. § 19-2521(1).
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The maximum prison sentence for discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle is 15
years. I.C. § 18-3317. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 12 years, with five years
fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.138-41.) On appeal, Hammond
contends that his sentence is excessive in light of his status as a first-time felon, support from his
mother, mental health issues, and purported remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) Hammond has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
While Hammond’s conviction in this case represents his first felony conviction, he has
previously been convicted of numerous misdemeanor offenses, including leaving a gas station
without paying, failing to purchase driver’s license (amended from driving without privileges),
disorderly conduct (amended from battery), driving without privileges, possession of drug
paraphernalia with intent to use (amended from possession of marijuana), using a telephone to
annoy, harass, intimidate, or threaten, violating a domestic violence protection order, disturbing
the peace (amended from second degree stalking), two counts of driving under suspension, and
four counts of violating a no contact order. (PSI, pp.10-14. 1) Hammond’s criminal record also
includes multiple charges that were eventually dismissed, including burglary and possession of a
financial transaction card. (PSI, pp.10-15.) In this case, Hammond was driving alongside
another car, got angry at the driver, fired his loaded gun at the victim’s vehicle two times, and
fled. (PSI, pp.7-9.) Damage to the victim’s car included a shattered driver’s side rear window
and a bullet hole in the door post between the front door and rear window. (PSI, p.8.)
Hammond’s claim that the district court did not adequately consider other mitigating
factors such as his mental health issues, family support and purported remorse do not show the
district court abused its discretion. Hammond asserts he has mental health issues that warrant a
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lesser sentence (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5), yet he denied ever being diagnosed with a mental
illness, and admitted that he “feigned” symptoms to be removed from jail (PSI, pp.21, 55-56).
Hammond also stated that he does not think mental health treatment is necessary, and the mental
health evaluator reported that Hammond “does not appear to have elevated risk related to mental
health issues.” (PSI, pp.60, 65.) The other mitigating factors Hammond cites—support from his
mother and his purported remorse—do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense.
At sentencing, the district court set forth its reasons for imposing Hammond’s sentence
and declining to place Hammond on probation. (2/5/18 Tr., p.30, L.13 – p.31, L.14.) The court
was concerned about the seriousness of the offense and was understandably “bother[ed]” by the
fact that Hammond’s case initially presented as one in which Hammond’s mental health was as
issue but that the most recent “report suggests that’s not true.” (2/5/18 Tr., p.30, L.13 – p.31,
L.3.) In light of the gravity of the offense and the conflicting reports regarding Hammond’s
mental condition, the district court acted well within its discretion in imposing the underlying
sentence and retaining jurisdiction so that it would have “more information” to determine
whether Hammond is a suitable candidate for probation. (See 2/5/18 Tr., p.31, Ls.10-14.) The
state submits that Hammond has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully
set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its
argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “CONFIDENTIAL
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS HAMMOND 45894-001.pdf.”
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hammond’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of October, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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